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ABSTRACT 
With the ongoing Covid19 pandemic, the adoption of policies and measures 
restricting mobility can be observed all over the world. This paper notes that 
the relationship between migration and development is circular and complex, 
embracing both negative and positive impacts. It explores the enactment of 
migration management policies that favour development at home (Africa) to 
prevent migration, with the trade-offs of security concerns. The paper finds 
these policies and measures to have failed and proposes what can be done to 
ensure a better Africa-European Union (EU) migration management. 
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Migration management has earned great scholarly and political interest while 
remaining a theoretically contested notion (Ansem de Vries & Guild, 2019). There 
is no universally accepted definition of migration management. For the purpose 
of this research, the definition advanced by Ann Beduschi is adopted. Beduschi 
holds migration management to be “different strategies, policies, processes and 
procedures, negotiated and adopted by relevant actors at the international level to 
provide a framework to manage migratory flows in an orderly and predictable 
manner” (Beduschi, 2020:3). However, as Castles notes, “the political will and 
assumed capacity to manage migratory flows is often contradicted by reality, as 
migration is a complex phenomenon that cannot be easily ‘managed” (Castles,  
2004b:214). This has not hindered states, international organisations and even 
intergovernmental/supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU) 
and the African Union (AU) from trying to manage ‘large movements of people’ 
through the ‘implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’ 
(e.g., Valletta Action Plan, 2015). 
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The migration crisis that began in late 2014 and reached its zenith in 2015 
indicates such ‘planned and well-managed migration policies’ have registered 
limited success. This is because migration governance “juxtaposes two potentially 
competing visions: regulating forms of mobility and controlling irregular 
migration” (Zanker, 2019). Regarding the former, migration is accepted as an 
instrument for development. Policies in this direction seek to facilitate mobility 
(Zanker, 2019). However, with the ongoing Covid19 pandemic, the adoption of 
policies and measures restricting mobility has been observed all over the world. In 
the current pandemic situation, the return to the status quo ante on mobility 
remains a thing of speculation. It is worthy of note that the relationship between 
migration and development is circular and complex, embracing both negative and 
positive impacts (Clemens, 2014, cited in Zanker, 2019). Development is also 
considered a territorialized process (disconnected from globalization), leading to 
the enactment of migration policies that prefers development at home to ‘prevent’  
migration (Nijenhuis & Leung, 2017). Consequently, to policymakers, development 
is a trade-off to security concerns (Zanker, 2019). 
Regarding irregular migration, the militarization of EU borders since 2015 is 
evident. Based on the alleged fear that immigration may threaten public health 
and order, and/or the cultural identity of the recipient countries, migrants have 
increasingly been portrayed as a securitized object (i.e., a security threat from 
which Europe must shield itself by any means necessary) (Szalai, 2015). For 
example, in 2015, a former Polish Prime Minister alleged migrants have brought 
diseases like cholera and dysentery in Europe, as well as “all sorts of parasites and  
protozoa, which, while not dangerous in the organism of these people, could be 
dangerous here” (Cienski, 201G). The outbreak of the Covid19 pandemic reinforced 
this rhetoric. For example, such rhetoric was re-echoed by the Hungarian Prime 
Minister who in response to a radio interview question on why universities had 
been closed, but not schools, said “it is because there are lots of foreigners there. 
Our experience has taught us that primarily foreigners brought in the disease and 
that it is spreading among foreigners” (“Hungary’s Orban blames foreigners”, 
2020). While it is a fact that the first cases of Covid19 brought to Hungary came 
with returning Iranian students, one should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. 
Orban is often the victim of the liberal media as he is usually presented as the 
villain, whatever he says or does. 
Adopting the securitized approach to migration colligates the freedom of 
movement (which until the outbreak of the Covid19 was possible) within Europe 
with stronger borders (“Fortress Europe”) and an ‘externalization’ of migration  
controls (Andersson, 201G; Bourbeau, 2015). Externalization of migration sees 
borders not as ‘the territorial limit of the [supra-] state but [as] the management 
practices directed at “where the migrant is”’ (Cobarrubias et al., 2014:19). This is 
evident concerning undocumented migration, whereby Europe out-sources 
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border work to follow migrants upstream along their routes. Italy’s 2017 
controversial agreement with the Libyan coast guard reflects this practice of 
externalization. Since the collapse of the Ghaddafi regime, Italy has been providing 
technical support to the Libyan coastguard as well as information on migrant 
vessels (Bathke, 2017). The goal of externalization is to stop migrants before they 
approach Europe. Given that most illegal migrants come from sub-Saharan Africa 
and transit through countries like Sudan, Mali, Niger, Libya, and Tunisia to EU 
member states, the EU and its member states have found it increasingly imperative 
to cooperate with Africa on migration issues. 
Migration research within and with Africa is limited, geographically and 
thematically, focusing only on one region or type of migration category (e. g.,  
forced versus ‘voluntary’ migration) (Brachet, 2010). According to Flahaux and de 
Haas (201G) whilst the literature on migration patterns in Africa repeatedly 
highlight that most African migration is intra-African, the fact that those moving 
out of Africa do not only move to Europe but also to the Gulf countries and the 
Americas (Blackwell & de Haas, 2007) is not reflected in the literature on the topic 
(see Schoumaker et al., 2015; Sander & Maimbo, 2003). A research gap, therefore, 
exists in migration governance between Europe and Africa. Some policy 
frameworks exist and acknowledge the need for Africa-EU migration to be 
transnationally governed. Nevertheless, gaps exist between rhetoric and 
implemented policies (Zanker, 2019). These gaps, which Czaika and de Haas (2013) 
termed the ‘implementation gap’, have not been addressed in considerable depth 
in terms of the EU-Africa regional cooperation on migration. Considering that the 
need for transnational governance of Africa-EU migration has been acknowledged 
and policies adopted, yet gaps exist in their implementation, this research is 
interested in the question: 
• How has the EU-Africa regional cooperation on migration failed and what 
can be done about it? 
To answer this question, this paper will consider the rhetoric contained in the 
various policy instruments and the implementation of these instruments from 
2000 to the present. The year 2000 is selected as the point of departure for this 
research because it was in 2000 that the first Africa-EU summit took place, under 
the aegis of the EU and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), now African 
Union (AU). The rest of the paper is structured as follows: 
• Section 2 explores the EU-Africa regional migration policy instruments, 
paying close attention to their rhetoric and goals. 
• Section 3 explores the implementation of these policy instruments and 
highlights how these instruments have failed to achieve their intended 
goals. 
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• Section 4 offers a general conclusion and highlights what can be done to 
ensure better cooperation on migration between the EU and Africa. 
 
2. MIGRATION  MANAGEMENT  IN  EU-AFRICA  RELATIONS 
In 2005, 13 migrants were killed, and hundreds wounded while trying to climb 
over the fenced border into the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla which sits 
on the northern shores of Morocco’s Mediterranean coast. These events signalled 
the need for a ‘global strategic approach to managing migration’ (European  
Commission, 2005). The outcome was the adoption of the Global Approach to 
Migration (GAM) in 2005 which was clarified in 2011 to include “Mobility” and it 
became the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This policy 
document provides an overarching framework for the EU’s external migration and  
asylum policy and pursues four goals of equal importance: 
• managing legal migration. 
• preventing and combating irregular migration. 
• maximizing the development impact of migration. 
• promoting international protection. 
The GAMM lays the foundation for a new framework for EU migration and 
asylum policy. This shift in policy was reflected in the EU’s call for striking a 
balance between the various aspects of migration and was formally introduced in 
a 2008 communication titled “Strengthening the Global Approach to Migration:  
Increasing Coordination, Coherence and Synergies”. 
To implement the ‘global approach’, mobility partnerships were introduced. 
Under these partnerships, the EU embarked on developing an innovative way to 
addressing migration issues in all their complexity’. The first of these partnerships  
(the EU-Africa Partnership for Migration, Mobility, and Employment) was 
launched in Lisbon (2007), together with an action plan and framework for 
dialogue and cooperation with the African Union as its privileged contact point. 
Amongst the priority actions touted by the European Council was the adoption of 
a Strategy for Africa, which clearly showed the aim to strengthen migration 
cooperation with African countries. 
Migration has no doubt been one of the AU and EU’s areas of collaboration. 
The two regions and their representative collective organs have jointly adopted 
several policy frameworks categorized as soft laws, which shall be explored under 
this section of the paper. This section shall be divided into two sub-sections: The 
first explores the policy documents jointly adopted, while the second offers an 
analysis of the policy documents. 
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2.1. Policy Instruments Adopted 
These instruments shall be grouped and analyzed under two time-frames: Pre- 
2014 instruments (1) and post-2014 instruments (2). 
2.1.1. Pre-2014 instruments 
The instruments adopted during this phase include the Cairo Action Plan 
(2000), Cotonou Agreement (2000), The Rabat Process (200G), the Tripoli Process 
(200G), and the Khartoum Process (2014). While it is tempting to engage in a 
content description of all the listed instruments, such endeavour shall be avoided. 
Rather, the fine line that connects all these documents shall be made visible. 
Though adopted at different periods, these instruments have one thing in 
common: they seek to provide a solution to one of the challenges facing both 
Africa and Europe – Migration. As contained in the Cairo Action Plan (2000), the 
EU laid down several priority action areas, mainly consisting of supporting African 
countries in ensuring free intra-African mobility of labour and migration and 
collaborating in addressing the root causes of migration and asylum-seeking in 
source, transit, and recipient countries. Further, the action plan discusses the 
reciprocal integration of migrants, migrant rights, and readmission agreements 
between European and African countries (United Nations Conference on Trade 
And Development, 2000). 
In 2000, another agreement was signed in Cotonou between the EU and the 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP). Known as the Cotonou 
Agreement and set to expire in September 2020, this agreement governed 
cooperation between the parties in the domain of development, politics, economy, 
and trade. Article 13, which was the most contentious of the Agreement, contained 
a migration clause. Article 13 defines the parameters of the EU-ACP dialogue on 
migration and is the result of a difficult compromise between the parties’ different 
views and interests on migration. As highlighted by Vanheukelom et al (200G:G), 
“On the EU side, member state; under domestic pressure to reduce irregular 
migration from Africa; strongly endorsed the integration of a readmission clause 
into the Agreement. On the ACP side, securing the protection of the rights of 
migrants’ residing and working in the EU   was   the   most   relevant 
concern”. Negotiations for EU-Africa relations post-Cotonou is ongoing. 
From 2005, several EU-African declarations, partnerships and other 
cooperative frameworks have been created to establish a mutually beneficial 
‘management’ of African migration. Emphasis is placed here on ‘migration 
management’ and ‘partnership’, given that they have been adopted for the distinct 
goal of clarifying that the EU’s intention no longer rested on one-sided control and 
prevention (Hansen & Jonsson, 2011). In this case, migration management to 
enhance Africa’s development is paramount, and must be realized through such 
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measures as codes of conduct to prevent brain drain, facilitate remittances, assist 
the return of highly skilled migrants, encourage the role of diasporas and migrant 
communities in the development of Africa, and to promote democratic 
governance and human rights. 
Such and other objectives unfolded in the wake of the Euro-Africa Ministerial 
Conference on Migration and Development, held in Rabat in 200G (the Rabat 
Process). This conference was convened in part by the aforementioned Ceuta and 
Melilla incidents. An even greater motive for the conference consisted of the 
significantly increased entry of African migrants to the EU in 2005 and 200G. Both 
the Spanish government and the EU Commission claimed that long term solutions 
could not be based on security measures alone, but also required measures 
reducing inequalities between the North and the South (Mead, 2005). In line with 
this, the conference in Rabat adopted both the security and development 
dimensions of migration on its agenda. 
In 2018, during the Euro-African Ministerial Conference held in Marrakesh, the 
need to encourage and strengthen pathways to regular migration was recognized 
by the participants. They also recognized the need to promote the mobility of 
certain categories of travellers such as businessmen and businesswomen, young 
professionals, or researchers between European and North, West, and Central 
African countries. (European Commission, 2019). The promotion of regular 
migration and mobility especially of young people and women, between Europe 
and North, West and Central Africa, and within these regions was equally decided 
upon. 
One should note that though the security and development dimensions of 
migration appeared in the Rabat process, the security approach got the better side 
of it (Noll, 200G:1). The very first concrete measure that emerged from the 200G 
Rabat conference was the setting up of a common EU coast guard tasked with 
patrolling the waters between the African mainland and the Canary Islands. 
Since Rabat, there have been several high-level EU-African meetings and 
agreements on migration, adopting the same rhetoric of ‘partnership of equals’  
‘win-win dynamics,’ “security and African development”. For example, the 200G 
Tripoli Process or the Joint Africa-EU Declaration on migration and development 
was coated as a “partnership” aimed at addressing “migration and its root causes 
through broader development and poverty reduction strategies”. Similarly, the 
2014 EU-Horn of Africa Initiative (the Khartoum Process) also referred to a 
“partnership to…promote sustainable development to address the root causes of 
irregular migration; establish a regional framework for return, including 
voluntary, and reintegration; and assist countries in establishing and managing 
established centres and providing access to asylum processes”. Both policy 
instruments include clauses highlighting development benefits to African 
countries if they cooperated with the EU on migration issues. 
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2.1.2. Post-2014 Instrument 
The main instrument here is the Valletta Summit on Migration Action Plan 
adopted in 2015. This instrument introduced a trust fund – the European Union 
Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTFA) – with an initial budget of EUR 1.8 
billion, key to the issue of the relationship between migration and development. 
Though these relationships are complex, EU policies have in the past presented 
them as superficial, entirely based on countering the root causes of irregular 
migration. This approach is repeated in the Valletta Action Plan wherein both 
parties (the EU and Africa) reaffirmed their commitment to “address the root  
causes of migration; to advance legal migration and mobility possibilities; to 
strengthen the fight against irregular migration; to prevent and fight migrant 
smuggling, eradicating trafficking in human beings; and to strengthen 
international protection and step-up assistance” (European Council, 2015:17). 
Pastore (201G) notes that one clear objective of this document is to strengthen 
the external projection of European control and protection policies to keep many 
migrants and asylum seekers as possible in Africa. 
2.2. Analysis 
EU policy makers acknowledge most migration take place within the continent 
(Zanker, 2019). However, EU-Africa migration management policy documents still 
focus on irregular migration towards Europe (Zanker, 2019), given the 
preponderance of the terms ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ migrants and the insertion of a 
South-North dimension in the said instruments. Put simply, the documents 
indicate the EU perceives migration from Africa as a security issue. The result has 
been among others, EU-Africa border militarization which has been greatly 
criticized within the academic, civil society and political milieu. For example, the 
former AU Chairperson – Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma –stated that ‘the problem that 
we are facing today is in part because some countries in Europe have taken a 
fortress approach…’ and that ‘... the African Union expresses concern about the 
militarization of its shores and airspace’ (African Union, 2015). The EU’s focus on 
migration as a security issue underlines the belief that migration may infringe on 
public order and consequently state sovereignty. According to DeVargas and 
Donzelli there is a tendency in the EU to conflate crime and terrorism with 
migratory movement (DeVargas & Donzelli, 2014). Inserting the words ‘fighting’, 
‘combatting’, ‘illegal’, with respect to migration in the various policy documents,  
creates a ‘linguistic action’ or a ‘speech act’ and convey a sense of ‘urgency’ and 
‘priority’(Weaver & Buzan, 1993:3). Furthermore, the language of these documents 
does not merely describe, but also mobilize certain meanings, thus creating a 
‘domain of insecurity’, which is further tackled through specific security practices. 
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Development issues have equally been at the forefront of EU-Africa 
cooperation. Development had from the beginning been firmly placed on the 
agenda by African partner states, while the EU and its member states had clung to 
security. However, a change in perspective can be observed over the years: the ‘root 
causes approach’ initially provided the main frame for understanding the link  
between migration and development. Irregular migration was perceived as 
negative phenomenon to be curbed by development cooperation. Over the last 
decade, the analysis has come to be much more differentiated and the potential 
impact of migration on development has taken a front seat. The change in 
perspective has led to a more holistic view of migration and equally offered a 
common frame to discuss legal migration, irregular migration, and labour 
migration from an overarching perspective. For example, discussions during the 
Rabat Process started with debate on irregular migration particularly between 
Spain and Morocco, but it soon became clear that a security-driven approach could 
neither help both parties understand the dynamics of irregular migration nor 
contribute to sustainable solutions. It was realized that if well-managed migration 
could be a be a positive element for the economies of both origins and destination 
countries and the migrants, if linked to sustainable development. 
The policy documents also presented legal migration as alternative to irregular 
migration and as something positive for the African continent. The decision to 
migrate irregularly/illegally is sometimes due to very restrictive legal channels for 
migration, or the lack of information about such legal channels. Hence, opening 
legal channels for migration, providing better information on legal migration 
possibilities and on the risks of irregular migration would be crucial to managing 
migration flows. Nevertheless, legal migration remains a bone of contention 
between the EU and Africa. Here, the different views between the EU and AU or 
African states are visible. While the EU favours restricting mobility to the African 
continent and returning irregular migrants back to Africa, African states are more 
interested in opening channels for legal migration to Europe. The strong rhetoric 
of legal migration in the policy instruments tends to be vague, often referring to 
educational programs. This vagueness and limited avenue for legal migration only 
indicate the disagreement between the parties as to where legal migration 
channels should lead to. In a way, it also highlights the asymmetric power 
dynamics between the two parties, with the EU being the stronger power, 
dictating the terms to the weaker African side. 
One would agree with Zanker (2019), and Nijenhuis & Leung (2017) that 
migration has become increasingly accepted as a tool for development and that 
development may be considered as a territorialized process leading to the 
enactment of migration policies that favour development at home to ‘prevent’ 
migration. Put simply, the EU-Africa policy frameworks adopt an approach aimed 
at curbing migration from Africa by first of all supporting development activities 
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and poverty reduction strategies in Africa so that African youths can stay in Africa 
and not seek for opportunities in Europe. If that fails, then as a last resort, 
encourage legal migration (to Europe) through various schemes such as the 
liberalization of visa regimes for certain categories of people (students, 
businessmen and businesswomen, etc). This approach goes in tandem with a 
securitized approach (fortification of EU borders, externalization of migration 
control, etc.). 
In line with these policy frameworks, during the 2018 High-Level Forum Africa- 
Europe held in Vienna, the former President of the EU Commission – Jean-Claude 
Juncker – reiterated Europe’s ambition for a true and fair partnership among 
equals with Africa. He admitted Europe’s future is tied with Africa’s and proposed 
a new Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable Investment and Jobs intending to 
attract both European and African investment and create 10 million jobs in Africa 
over the next five years (European Commission, 2018). 
Steps have already been taken to implement these policy initiatives. It is 
therefore imperative to examine whether these steps have yielded fruits. 
 
3. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY INSTRUMENTS AND HOW 
THEY HAVE FAILED 
To achieve its goal of stopping irregular migration from Africa, the EU created 
the EUTFA. As of 31 December 2018, resources allocated to the EUTFA amounted 
to about EUR 4.G billion coming from the European Development Fund and 
member states and donors (European Commission, 2018). Of this sum, around 
EUR 490 million is pledged by donors (Switzerland and Norway) and member 
states, many of whom are struggling to finance the inflow of migrants/refugees in 
their home countries (European Commission, 2018). 
The EUTFA operates along four strategic axes which are set out in the Strategic 
Orientation Document adopted in November 2015 by the Strategic Board of the 
EUTFA. These axes are: 
• Greater economic and employment opportunities. 
• Strengthening resilience of communities. 
• Improved migration management. 
• Improved governance and conflict prevention. 
It is along these axes that the implementation of the EU-Africa instruments 
shall be explored and later analysed. 
3.1.1. Greater economic and employment opportunities 
In 2018, the European Commission accelerated the implementation of actions 
aimed at reducing motivations for migrating illegally by creating employment and 
economic activities in countries of origin and transit. In the Sahel and Lake Chad 
8G REVIEW OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY 2021/3 
 
region, tailor-made responses have been offered to specific challenges addressing 
constraints on the labour market including employability of youth and economic 
development in production sectors. By the end of December 2018, 92 actions 
amounting to 1.7 billion euros have been approved for this region. These actions 
support 24,211 beneficiaries to increase their skills and employability through 
Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) actions (European 
Commission, 2018:21). Based on the EUTFA 2018 annual report, previously 
approved actions have made considerable progress to support job creation for 
young people through ‘quick win’ actions in origin and transit areas of Guinea and  
Niger. About 10,852 jobs have been created in the region (European Commission, 
2018:21). It should be noted that the report is silent on what constitutes ‘quick win’  
actions, the nature of the 10,852 jobs created and the estimated salaries or wages 
these jobs will bring to the employed. In other words, information on job and 
income stability is absent. Therefore, it goes to reason that if the jobs are not 
permanent and/or the income/wage derived from said jobs are low concerning the 
individuals’ family size and needs, the said individuals will be left with no choice 
than to try migrating up north to Europe in search of better opportunities. 
3.1.2. Strengthening the resilience of communities 
The EUTFA 2018 annual report indicated that in the Sahel and Lake Chad 
region, actions have been taken to address food insecurity and malnutrition whilst  
improving access to basic services, promoting public services and long term issues 
such as social cohesion and natural resources management (European 
Commission, 2018:25). Resilience actions apply “an agile and conflict-sensitive 
approach, capable of adapting to a rapidly changing context”, (European 
Commission, 2018:25). Examples of resilience action cited in the report include the 
improvement, through diagnosis, monitoring and infrastructure maintenance of 
water, hygiene, and sanitation services in Far North Cameroon, which will benefit 
30,000 households (European Commission, 2018:25). 
The report also states that in the Horn of Africa, the EUTFA has delivered more 
than two million basic services in the region (European Commission, 2018:32).  
However, the report is silent as to what is considered a ‘basic service’. Programs 
undertaken in this region include among others, the IMPACT program in South 
Sudan which is helping to keep children in school by providing more than 28,000 
primary teachers in almost 2,500 schools with salary supplements that allow the 
teachers to stay in service and increase their attendance (European Commission, 
2018:32). The report also claims that actions targeting the improvement of living 
conditions, household resilience and economic opportunities for refugees and 
locals have also been undertaken in Ethiopia. It should be noted that such a claim 
is very vague, and it camouflages that no outcome can be reported. 
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Given that migration patterns in the North of Africa are complex, it is asserted 
that the EUTFA continues to ensure protection and assistance to those in need. 
Notable action undertaken includes the provision of essential healthcare, critical 
goods, and a safe environment for the most vulnerable persons. Activities aimed 
at enhancing sustainable livelihoods for displaced persons and their host 
communities and social cohesion have also been carried out (European 
Commission, 2018: 37). However, the EUTFA does not define what it meant by 
critical goods, neither does it provide its readers with the type of activities it carried 
out aimed at enhancing the sustainable livelihoods of the targeted beneficiaries. 
This makes it difficult for one to assess the success or failures of the measures 
implemented. 
3.1.3. Improved migration management 
The 2018 EUTFA report contends that in the Sahel and Lake Chad region, 
continuous support is offered to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) Evacuation Transit Mechanism (ETM). This has enabled the protection, 
evacuation and resettlement of refugees stranded in Libya. Support has also been 
extended to the EU-IOM Joint Initiative providing protection, voluntary return 
assistance to migrants in transit and reintegration in the countries of origin 
(European Commission, 2018:25). For example, between September 2017 and 
December 2018, 2,202 persons have been evacuated from Libya to Niger in the 
ETM frame, 3,719 individuals have been proposed for resettlement from Libya and 
Niger to 12 countries, while 1,598 individuals qualified as a refugee has departed 
for resettlement from Niger and Libya to Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the 
United States (European Commission, 2018:25). 
According to the Commission report, in the Horn of Africa, the EUTFA has 
continued to work with African partner countries to develop national and regional 
approaches to address migration challenges, help protect vulnerable migrants and 
reintegrate those who wished to return (European Commission, 2018:32). This is 
done through the Better Migration Management program, run in partnership with 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Development and Cooperation. More 
than 10,000 people have received voluntary assistance, and many more have been 
given additional help to reintegrate, in the form of immediate assistance on arrival, 
psycho-social support, skills training, education, among others. These returnees 
come from Libya and other countries in the Horn of Africa. 
3.1.4. Improved governance and conflict prevention 
In the Sahel and Lake Chad region, the EUTFA in 2018 supported regional 
cooperation through organisations such as G5 Sahel to foster long-term stability. 
The G5 Sahel is an institutional framework for the coordination of regional 
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cooperation in development policies and security matters in West Africa. Its 
member states are Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. With 
financial support from the EUTFA, the Sahel Security School, which is a part of 
the G5 Sahel was set up. This school’s ambition is regional: promoting dialogue 
between law enforcement agencies and their communities as well as developing a 
common culture about crisis and threats (terrorism, radicalization, and organized 
crime) (European Commission, 2018:2G). Still, in 2018, six new actions were 
approved totalling EUR 89 million. New activities included quick impact security 
measures in Mali, migration and border management in Niger, increasing security 
in border areas in Chad as well as support the fight against migrant smuggling and 
human trafficking in Cape Verde, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau (European 
Commission, 2018:2G-27). 
In the Horn of Africa, a regional action worth EUR 5 million was approved in 
2017 to better equip national agencies to disrupt migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking networks in the region through the efficient use of financial 
investigation and anti-money laundering tools (European Commission, 2018:33). 
Over 8,700 people from both state and non-state organisations have been trained 
on border management, conflict prevention, countering violent extremism and 
protecting civilians using a human rights approach (European Commission, 
2018:34). 
The above paragraphs show that goals 1 and 2 of the EUTFA emphasize 
addressing the root causes of irregular migration (through jobs and resilience), 
while goal 4 focuses on addressing causes of displacement (through governance 
and conflict prevention). Goal 3 is the only goal dedicated to migration 
management. As Zanker notes, none of these goals presumes a positive migration- 
for-development nexus, nor do they focus on legal forms of migration to Europe 
(Zanker, 2017:31). In analyzing projects aimed at addressing Goal 3, Zanker found 
that at least five mentioned variation on ‘promoting strengthened migration 
management’ at both national and local levels (Zanker, 2017:32). More specific 
targets include encouraging diaspora investment, capacity building for managing 
migrant influxes, and the development, harmonization and implementation of 
migration policies ranging from human trafficking to labour laws. Four projects 
were directed at fighting organized crime and traffic in humans while 7 projects 
focused on awareness and sensitization campaigns to deter people from leaving in 
the first place (Zanker, 2017:33), as well as projects aimed at setting up research 
observatories, monitoring and evaluating projects and enhancing data collection 
(13 projects). 11 projects focus on improving conditions for voluntary return and 
reintegration. Though a few of the sensitization campaigns refer to legal 
migration, the overall emphasis is on (voluntary) returning migrants and securing 
borders. 
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3.2. The failures of the Policy Instruments 
According to Welz (2015), “despite numerous summits and meetings, the 
achievements of the EU-Africa instruments on migration have been few and far 
between, depending on the political commitment of individual states”. Welz’s  
assertion has been resounded by scholars like Reitano (201G) who contended that 
the Rabat Process has produced few substantial results despite running for more 
than a decade. 
Zanker (2017) posits that the implementation of the EU-Africa instruments has 
been varied. The Khartoum Process is reputed to be even more difficult to 
implement considering the lack of mobility available there. This is also 
compounded by the fact that the Sudanese and Eritrean citizens are not allowed 
to leave their country without permission and the lack of trust between the 
countries participating (Reitano, 201G). While supporting Zanker’s assertion on 
the varied nature of implementing the instruments, this paper contends the 
implementation of the policy instruments have not curbed the inflow of irregular 
migrants into the EU (1), neither do they offer international protection to 
migrants (2). 
3.2.1. Failure to stop irregular migration 
Since 2015, migrant boats continue to cross into EU waters. The lucky ones 
manage to make it to EU shores. Some are not so fortunate. Either they are 
intercepted and returned to Libya, or their lifeless bodies wash up on EU shores or 
are lost at sea. This indicates not only a failure to curb irregular migration from 
Africa, but also the acuteness of the situation. The number of boat arrivals at the 
shores of the EU is a testament to this acuteness. According to the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) from January to November 2019, 89,997 
migrants/refugees entered Europe through the sea. This represents an 11 per cent 
decline from 101,185 that arrived during the same period, the previous year. The 
death record for that year stood at 1090, representing about a 52 per cent decline 
from the previous year’s figures for the same period (2098 individuals) (IOM, 2019). 
From January 2020 to April 2020, 1G,724 migrants entered Europe by sea, 
indicating a 1G per cent increase during the same period a year earlier (IOM, 2020).  
When Covid19 started, states around the world took measures such as instituting 
a general lockdown to cushion their citizens from the devastating health impact 
of this pandemic. As a result, the number of irregular entries by boat into the EU 
dwindled. However, the gradual/slight lifting of restrictions that happened in 
summer 2020 brought in fresh attempts at illegally entering the EU either with the 
help of smugglers or with the assistance of states like Turkey who have 
weaponized migration. 
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3.2.2. Failure to offer international protection to irregular migrants 
The EU-Africa instruments do not offer international protection to irregular 
migrants. The EU adopts a human rights language to “sell” its Trust Fund 
programme and is quite careful to paint the issues it seeks to address as complex 
(Chandler, 2018). However, in practice, the human rights of those trying to enter 
the EU illegally are overridden by the zeal to preserve EU security. The EU’s border 
control measures “have tightened the noose around the North and Horn of Africa, 
making dangerous journeys even more perilous” (Reitano, 201G). Millions of euros 
have been poured into renovating detention facilities and the training of guards in 
Libya. Yet, these centres are still in a horrible state. The EU has equally allocated 
over 100 million euros to the IOM to return people to their homes through 
country partnership (Hayden, 2019). The UNHCR also received some funds to 
evacuate some people to Niger for asylum screening and resettlement. As 
Chandler argues, “removing people from horrific detention centres is a 
humanitarian imperative but, regrettably, it does not address the underlying issue, 
i.e., the EU’s continued support for the Libyan coast guard has forced vulnerable  
people directly back into the same detention centres where they are bought and 
sold” (Chandler, 2018). 
The EU border control projects have equally been widely critiqued. The EU 
border control projects have been held to contradict not only European foreign 
policy and diplomatic actions but also basic European human rights standards 
(Castillejo, 201G). 
Moreover, the use of the words “to prevent and fight migrant smuggling”, 
“eradicating trafficking in human beings;” and “to strengthen international 
protection and step up assistance” in the policy instruments seemed to ignore the 
fact that smuggling and trafficking thrive with the blessing of the certain North 
African and Horn of Africa governments officials, police and border guards (Davy, 
2017; Frouws & Horwood, 2017). An investigation by Refugees Deeply (an 
independent digital media project dedicated to covering refugee issues around the 
world) documented the involvement of Sudan’s high-level government officials in 
trafficking (Suleiman & van Dijken, 2018). This confirms a claim made by the US 
Department of State that Sudan does not meet the minimum criteria for the 
elimination of trafficking (US Department of State, 2018). 
The above analysis highlights an implementation gap between rhetoric and 
practice in EU-Africa migration policy as asserted by Czaika and de Haas’ (2013). 
The EU’s migration policy emphasizes tackling the root causes of irregular 
migration through projects targeting the creation of jobs and building resilience 
in communities across the 3 priority regions in Africa. However, as Frasca notes, 
“EU migration policies are too often victims of eurocentrism, posing unrealistic 
goals and expectations towards cooperation with Africa” (Frasca, 2019:8). It is a 
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fact that African migration is largely intra-African, with only a tiny percentage of 
Africans migrating to Europe. Moreover, the EU is not the only player in Africa.  
China, Russia, and the US are making are interested in the continent. For this 
reason, the EU should consider reassigning due weight to cooperation with Africa. 
Cooperation with Africa is bigger than migration cooperation and attempts to 
‘stop’ migration from Africa have proven to be ineffective. 
In addition, the various policy instruments and the measures taken to 
implement the EU’s goal of stopping migration to the EU from Africa, reveal how 
the EU in a practical sense believes it can generate a win-win dynamic between its 
security-oriented approach (fight against illegal migration) on one hand, and (as 
Hansen and Jonsson (2011)) puts it ‘its neoliberal fight for growth and 
competitiveness’ on the other hand. 
 
4. WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT? 
Migration is an important area in EU-Africa cooperation. Yet, the EU and Africa 
have fundamentally different views on migration management. As demonstrated 
in this paper, the EU and its member states prioritizing prevention and return 
while African states focus more on remittances and legal opportunities for 
migration. As equally highlighted in the first two sections of this paper, Europe’s 
approach does not acknowledge these differing interests and seeks to impose its 
own agendas in ways that threaten to undermine Africa’s ambitions. 
The EUTFA initiative has caused significant controversy: the EUTFA is based 
on the inaccurate hypothesis that development assistance can prevent migration. 
It diverts aid to migration goals, and its projects do not often fulfil development 
principles such as transparency, ownership, and alignment. In consideration of the 
failures of the policy instruments and measures to stop migration, it can be 
asserted that the EU has to change its approach to migration management and 
save itself the embarrassment of continuously putting the cart before the horse. 
To rectify the failures of the EU's current approach to migration management: 
• The EU must recognize that Europe will need African migration in the future. 
Put simply, the EU must accept that demographic and socioeconomic 
differences/realities mean that Africans with the will and/or resources will 
migrate towards Europe, and Europe will need African labour. The EU must 
work with Africa as equal partners to explore how best to promote movements 
that support Africa’s economic growth and allows both continents to reap the 
benefits of safe and orderly migration. This should include different types of 
migration opportunities:- circular migration, research and education, business 
and work- strengthening remittances and skills transfer to Africa. The EU 
should relax its visa regime and embrace circular migration. 
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• The EU needs to address its ‘solidarity deficit’ with its members on 
migration and asylum issues. This requires honesty concerning conflicting 
interests between member states and working towards effective common 
systems that can effectively manage fluctuating migratory flow and 
integrate incoming migrants (both irregular and regular). It will also require 
that EU leaders shift their current political discourse to build acceptance of 
migrants and migration. 
• The EU needs to switch from trying to address the ‘root causes’ of migration 
with short term emergency funds. There is considerable difficulty tackling 
the ‘root causes’ of involuntary movements through development 
cooperation and other measures. As Angenendt, Martin-Shields and 
Schraven (2017) note, given the international community’s limited success 
in addressing fragile statehood and the growing number of violent conflicts, 
more honesty is needed in the effective discussions. 
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